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Many people attuned to the bewildering cacophony of events
and swift pace of change in the world today will experience a sense of
disorientation, or at least uncertainty and unease. Settled assumptions
about politics, society, religion, economics, security, world peace -
and about life and a meaningful existence - are all being challenged
in a myriad of seemingly destabilizing ways. The world we once
knew, or thought we knew, is no more. Although in hindsight its
earlier roots can be discerned, this unanticipated state of extraordinary
flux has come upon us suddenly, particularly in the past decade,
rendering many of our long-held beliefs inadequate and obsolete.
In response, many observers are struggling to see and
describe, to frame and grasp, or to articulate what is going on and
where we are headed. Our traditional operational framework serves
reasonably well when it matches our circumstances and projects; but
the circumstances have changed radically. Our old ideas and
understandings are not only inadequate; they affirmatively inhibit us
from perceiving the new and unfamiliar.
The socio-legal arena - the realm of law and society - has
arguably experienced these changes more swiftly and more
extensively than almost any other particular province, in part because
the socio-legal arena reaches and touches just about everything. What
is a socio-legal theorist to do under these circumstances? More
pointedly, what is a socio-legal theorist who aims to produce a
general jurisprudence - which aspires to operate at a broad level of
generality and application - to do?
William Twining is no ordinary socio-legal theorist. He has
lived and worked in both Western and non-Western countries around
* Benjamin N. Cardozo Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law.
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the world. He has a vast knowledge of traditional legal theory, yet he
is anything but a traditionalist. He is one of the world's experts on
the writings of Jeremy Bentham. Twining wrote the leading text on
Karl Llewellyn and one of the most important works on the Legal
Realists, a text still read and cited more than three decades after he
produced it. His books and theories on Evidence are standard
material in the Anglo-American common law world. In addition, he
writes always-informative and frequently creative articles on an
extraordinary range of legal subjects, including legal education, legal
interpretation, comparative law, law and society, legal positivism,
legal pluralism, legal sociology and anthropology, postmodernism,
globalization, and, of course, general jurisprudence.' In the terms of
the scope of his learning and writings, no one in the legal academy is
comparable to Twining. In particular, no similarly accomplished
legal theorist - Twining held the Quain Chair in Jurisprudence at
University College London, also held by such luminaries as John
Austin and Ronald Dworkin - has drawn from and incorporated into
his legal theory work so much material traditionally excluded from
the field.
Before proceeding, a personal disclosure is necessary.
William is a friend. We have engaged in many personal and
intellectual discussions. His work has influenced my thinking and
writing in legal theory in more ways than I can identify. I find myself
in substantial agreement with his observations and analysis - alas,
even with his criticisms of my arguments. Consequently, rather than
critically responding to Twining's substantive arguments in his
article 2 (which I find convincing), I will reflect on what it means to
produce a general jurisprudence and on how it can be best understood
and furthered.
There are theorists who think it is neither desirable nor
possible to construct a general jurisprudence: that in the postmodern
age all attempts at macro-level theorizing are exercises in domination
1 See generally William Twining, A Post- Westphalian Conception of Law, 37
LAW & SOC'Y. REV. 199 (2003); WILLIAM TWINING, GLOBALISATION AND
LEGAL THEORY (2000); WILLIAM TWINING, Reviving General Jurisprudence, in
THE GREAT JURISTIC BAZAAR, 335 (2002).
2 See William Twining, General Jurisprudence, 15 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L.
REV. 1 (2007).
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or western intellectual hegemony, or elaborate fictions or useless
abstractions. 3 As someone who has attempted to construct a general
jurisprudence, I am not one of those skeptics, and will not rehash their
arguments. Instead, I will critically approach Twining's general
jurisprudence from the standpoint of an ally. I share many of the
same aims, and the points I raise are strategic rather than substantive.
I explore what I think are barriers to the building of a general
jurisprudence and I suggest ways to get around these barriers.
To state my position at the outset: I question whether a
general jurisprudence can be successful in the absence of an
intellectual home in which to nurture and accumulate knowledge for
this project. Twining is less troubled by this concern, for he believes
that a general jurisprudence is already being constructed. In his
understanding, jurisprudence is an activity that constitutes the
speculative aspect of law. As law changes to move beyond the
particular, jurisprudence changes in conjunction therewith, and hence
jurisprudence becomes more general. In this paper, I raise doubts
about whether this understanding of general jurisprudence is
adequate. More generally, I explore what it means to construct a
general jurisprudence, probing whether it can or should be understood
as a category of theorizing about law, or as an academic disciple, or
as a discreet project, or in some other way.
I. The Current Dominance of a Narrow Perspective on Law
As Twining points out, "during the twentieth century and
before, Western academic legal culture has tended to be state-
oriented, secular, positivist, 'top-down,' Northo-centric, unempirical,
and universalist in respect of morals.",4 Owing to these traits, western
legal theory provides an inadequate and misleading framework for
understanding or describing law today. Consider two fundamental
propositions enshrined within legal theory: that law is the product of
the state, and that state law has a monopoly on the legitimate
application of force in society. These two propositions are virtually
taken for granted within legal theory, but they make little sense in a
world characterized by overlapping and interpenetrating legal
regimes, and in light of the fact that the functions of dispute
3 Twining, supra note 2, at 46-47.
4 Id. at6.
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resolution and security (both policing and military) traditionally held
by the state are being privatized in many places.
Transnational business law known as the new lex mercatoria,
for example, is neither the product of nor tied to any particular state
(it is produced almost entirely through private parties) and certain of
its norms and institutions are entirely independent of the power of the
state. Consider also the legislative, administrative, and executive
powers of the European Union and its complex interrelation with the
legal authority of the individual member nations. What about human
rights norms and the international criminal courts, both of which
challenge legal authority of the nation state? What about religious
law? Islamic Law, for example, exists in various forms of interaction
with state legal regimes, ranging from selective incorporation, to
theocracy, to internal contestation and conflict. Is the "law" in
Lebanon the law of the state or the law of Hezbollah?
Extending the inquiry beyond official state legal regimes
raises even more complex questions. Around the world today there
are systems of customary law in various shapes, forms, and modes of
interaction with state law. In some situations, state law incorporates,
or is influenced by, bodies of customary law; customary law is
sometimes superior to state law; sometimes it is independent of state
law.5 Examples of "unofficial" law include Gypsy law, as well as
more esoteric forms of law, like mafia law or squatter law.
Furthermore, there are the many autonomous forms of normative
ordering - whether or not called "law" - that course through social
life, often exerting a greater influence on social behavior and social
order than the distant or weak state legal system.6
Anyone striving to understand law as a theoretical or social
matter will arbitrarily leave out much of the legal universe if this is
not recognized and considered. It is remarkable to note, therefore,
that the overwhelming proportion of books and articles on
jurisprudence rarely address these subjects. This assertion holds for
all four categories of jurisprudence distinguished by Twining:
analytical, normative, sociological, and critical.7 Analytical jurists
5 See,e.g., BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, UNDERSTANDING LAW IN MICRONESIA: AN
INTERPRETIVE APPROACH TO TRANSPLANTED LAW (1993).
6 See Twining, supra note 2, at 33-34.
7 See id. at 3.
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justify this omission by insisting that their domain largely consists of
conceptual analysis and clarification, which can be conducted without
close attention to the flux of actual events. They almost exclusively
occupy themselves with an analysis of Western legal concepts. This
avowed blinkering is particularly relevant to a general jurisprudence
because, as Twining points out, the most influential historical
advocates of a general jurisprudence, including Jeremy Bentham,
John Austin, and H.L.A. Hart, have worked within analytical
jurisprudence. 8 Theorists who engage in normative jurisprudence,
like Ronald Dworkin, insist that by its nature this type of analysis
requires immersion into particular state legal systems. 9 This narrows
the focus in two distinct ways, it centers the normative analysis on
particular systems rather than on a more general level, and it engages
almost entirely in internal normative debates. Most practitioners of
sociological jurisprudence, theorists who apply sociological insights
to issues in legal theory, also largely focus their inquiry on state law.
Similarly, most theorists engaged in critical jurisprudence - critical
legal studies, critical feminism, critical race theory, and critical
internationalism - link their analysis to state legal systems or to
international legal regimes.
This narrow focus, it must be emphasized, is sensible under
many circumstances. It suffices for the everyday purposes and
activities of the bulk of lawyers and legal officials whose work
revolves around state legal systems. The notion that the legal
universe is comprised of the law of the state and of international law -
the duo-Westphalian system of law 10, as Twining points out - has
dominated our understanding of law for several centuries precisely
because they have been of preeminent concern to legal professionals
in this period. Reinforcing the fact that traditional understandings and
the realities of practice encourage a narrow focus, there are two major
impediments to being more expansive: first, it requires hard work, and
second, much of the information necessary to expand our thinking
about empirical reality is not readily available. It is difficult enough
to master a single subject within a particular legal system. Going
beyond this narrow focus requires examining the actual activities of
'Id. at 17-18,22.
9 Id. at 13.
'
0 Id. at 5.
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legal officials (police, prosecutors, judges, probation officers,
corrections officers, etc.) in connection with the rules, examining the
actual behavior of the populace in relation to the legal rules, and
examining other normative and legal systems and societies. These are
daunting tasks that few can undertake successfully.
Two different fields have managed to escape the artificially
narrow assumptions perpetuated about law by the standard view:
comparative law and social scientific approaches to law. In the early
stage of the discipline, comparative law scholars were primarily
occupied with comparisons between common law and civil law legal
systems. Their subject matter, however, sensitized them to the
variability of legal forms outside the West, and exposed them to
unfamiliar phenomena (like Hindu law or Islamic law) that do not fit
neatly within the standard understanding. Comparative scholars soon
recognized the inadequacy of merely focusing on the official
trappings of the law. They realized that although the Turkish Civil
Code was modeled on the Swiss Civil Code,"' the reality of law in
Turkey would be obscured if one merely considers it as an example of
a civil law system. Theoretical debates about the necessity to locate a
proper tertium comparationis - a consistent baseline of comparison -
directed the attention of comparativists toward the social-legal realm
and required them to engage in functional analysis and to pay
attention to social and legal actions.
Similarly, while many social scientists who study law remain
within the standard duo paradigm, 12 a sizeable number of legal
anthropologists and legal sociologists repudiate this view. A
pioneering work in anthropology, Bronislaw Malinowski's Crime and
Custom in Savage Society, 3 formulated an influential argument that
"law" is not linked to the state or its institutions, but rather is found in
social relations.
The field of legal anthropology incorporates this rejection as
one of its core premises. Legal anthropologists produced studies of
institutionalized norm enforcement or institutionalized dispute
" See Seval Yildiri, Aftermath of a Revolution: A Case Study of Turkish Family
Law, 17 PACE INT'L L. REV. 350, 356 (2005).
12 Twining, supra note 2, at 32.
13 BRONISLAW MALINOWSKI, CRIME AND CUSTOM IN SAVAGE SOCIETY (6"h
impression, Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd. 1951).
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processing, usually in non-Western countries, characterizing these as
"law" or legal systems, despite the fact that these legal systems were
independent of any state or colonial legal systems. These systems
constituted "law" in the sense that they played a significant role in
maintaining social order and were seen as authoritative by the
populace. This body of literature, in turn, influenced a group of legal
sociologists who documented the existence of parallel social-ordering
phenomena in Western societies that operated in the shadow of state
law. Eugen Ehrlich, one of the founders of legal sociology, argued
that societies have official state law and unofficial "living law" and he
urged legal scientists to pay attention to both. 14 Socio-legal studies
came to focus on various aspects of the relationships between legal
phenomena and social phenomena: observing the activities of legal
officials and their impact, and observing the social sources of order
and their interaction with the official state law.'
5
Drawing from the quick sketch above, a few basic points can
be made. Legal professionals - lawyers and judges in particular - can
adequately conduct their activities with an exclusive focus on their
own official legal system. Owing to this fact, legal education - the
immediate purpose of which is to train lawyers for their professional
activities - must satisfy this narrow focus, and, furthermore, has little
incentive to go beyond it. Lawyers who are confronted with tasks that
go outside of the standard municipal law - in connection with human
rights cases, or the lex mercatoria, or when foreign law is relevant to
the case at hand - can incorporate this body of law into their practice
without altering any assumptions of the standard view. For traditional
and expedient reasons, the narrow focus of legal theorists matches the
narrow focus of the legal profession. Legal theory holds a respected
but peripheral position within the legal academy (and is seen widely
as irrelevant to the practice of law). The central focus for developing
knowledge of and about law, to state the key point, lies in knowing
what is necessary to function as a lawyer.
14 EUGEN EHRLICH, THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW
(1975).
15 See BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, REALISTIC SOCIO-LEGAL THEORY: PRAGMATISM
AND A SOCIAL THEORY OF LAW (1997); see also Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Folly
of the 'Social Scientific' Concept of Legal Pluralism, 20 J. OF LAW & SOC.'Y
192 (1993).
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Comparative law scholars, legal anthropologists, and legal
sociologists have worked outside of this narrow focus, but they are
marginal academic fields. Comparative law has a toehold in the legal
academy. Legal sociologists and legal anthropologists are subfields
of sociology and anthropology, respectively, and are generally
ignored by the legal academy.
Knowledge about law arises from two different realms: the
activities of legal actors, and the activities of academics. This marks
a significant differentiation in the production of legal knowledge and
knowledge about law. Legal actors respond to and develop legal
knowledge in connection with the demands and practices of legal
systems. In contrast, academics develop knowledge about law in
connection with the concerns and demands of their academic fields.
This differentiation results in the production of radically different
paradigms, perspectives, and knowledge. Consequently, although
there is a vast body of legal knowledge and knowledge about law, it is
not coherent or unified. There is no comprehensive framework within
which to collect this information and bring it all together.
The upshot of this discussion is that aspiring to a general
jurisprudence runs contrary to a fundamental constraint on the
modem production of knowledge. Knowledge develops in clearly
defined and sharply delineated specializations, each with their own
terminology, conceptual apparatuses, seminal texts, and sources of
institutional support. An approach to law which aims to be general in
scope, normatively sophisticated, and empirically informed, must
straddle multiple institutional and specialization barriers.
II. The Missing "Home" of Twining's General Jurisprudence
Twining's article would appear to refute my assertion that
there are significant barriers that operate against a general
jurisprudence. His analysis moves easily across all of the
aforementioned fields of knowledge.1 6 Twining situates his general
jurisprudence within jurisprudence proper, which he places within the
legal academy.17 Jurisprudence, in his understanding, is a speculative
activity that reflects upon and accompanies law. Twining's critical
16 See Twining, supra note 2.
17 See id. (discussing the philosophies of such legal theorists as Bertram, Hart,
Dworkin, Glenn, and Santos).
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argument is that analytical jurisprudence suffers from two major
defects.' 8  First, it fails to keep up with the push of globalization
which requires that jurisprudence go beyond attention to the narrow
Western view of law tied to Western nation states (and International
law).' 9 Second, it pays inadequate attention to the reality of law -
going beyond black-letter law to see how the law actually operates
and, more importantly, to examine actual social conduct relating to
law, including non-state legal phenomena. 20 Twining suggests that a
general jurisprudence of the type he describes promises to cure these
defects.
Although he directly engages the analytical jurisprudence
tradition, Twining's discussion and references also range across the
literature of comparative law and of law and society studies. He takes
up at length Patrick Glenn's comparative framework for legal
traditions, explores the argument of legal anthropologist Simon
Roberts, and refers to the ideas of various legal sociologists.
21
Besides analytical jurisprudence, none of these rich and varied
theoretical and empirical works are presented by the theorists
themselves as works in general jurisprudence. Instead, they are
situated in their own particular fields.
There are several different ways to understand the relations
between these various disciplines and general jurisprudence. One
possibility is that Twining hopes to alter the horizons of analytical
jurisprudence in the direction he prescribes; though he recognizes that
contemporary analytical jurists are, if anything, doggedly striding in
the opposite direction and becoming narrower and more abstract.
Another possibility is that Twining offers general jurisprudence as an
organizing framework for comparative law. Lending support to this
interpretation, Twining defines general jurisprudence in terms
congenial to the self-understanding of comparative law: "Here, I shall
use 'general jurisprudence' to refer to the theoretical study of two or
more legal traditions, cultures, or orders (including ones within the
same legal tradition or family) from the micro-comparative to the
1 Id. at23.
'9 Id. at 26-32.
20 Id. at 32-35.
21 Id.
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universal. 22 Yet another possibility is that Twining sees a general
jurisprudence as central to the sociological study of law and society.
Perhaps these are not alternative possibilities. Perhaps general
jurisprudence represents the next stage in the development of a
sophisticated and comprehensive theoretical, and empirically
informed, understanding of law and society that encompasses and
partakes of all of these currently separate fields.
Twining might well consider these questions about the
academic placement of general jurisprudence to be irrelevant. As I
indicated at the outset, he believes that jurisprudence is a speculative
activity that goes with law; as such, a general jurisprudence is
gradually being built regardless of how we label or categorize it.
Twining assumes a modest and open position:
I am sometimes asked to specify the kinds of issues
and lines of inquiry that I would include within my
view of General Jurisprudence. That is a reasonable
request. But it would be contrary to the spirit of this
paper to set out a master plan or blueprint for what
must be a collective enterprise involving multiple
perspectives and conceptions of the subject-matters of
our discipline that are as varied, fluid and multi-
layered as the discipline itself.
23
I wish to make three closely connected points about this
passage. First, a "general jurisprudence" in the sense promoted by
Twining does not constitute a discipline.24 The project he describes
bears no resemblance to what goes by this label in analytical
jurisprudence, as Twining makes clear. Unless he uses the phrase in
reference to the recent and isolated work of Twining, Tamanaha, and
a handful of others, our discipline simply does not exist as such. The
thrust of my earlier assertions is that no single discipline approaches
the law in the terms urged by Twining. Analytical jurisprudence is a
discipline, as is comparative law, legal sociology, and so forth; but
22 Id. at 19.
23 Id. at 52 (emphasis added).
24 Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary, 360 (1990) (explaining that
"discipline" is a "subject that is taught" or "a field of study").
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none of these disciplines shares the scope and parameters of the
general jurisprudence project envisioned by Twining.
This brings me to the second point. Beyond the thin sense
that each generates knowledge about law, these various disciplines are
not in fact engaged in a "collective enterprise." To the contrary, they
frequently are hostile to, dismissive of, or simply ignore one another.
Exceedingly rare is the individual who, like Twining, is conversant in
all of their respective literatures. Consequently, if the general
jurisprudence he describes must be a collective enterprise, as he says,
then it has slim prospects of even getting off the ground.
The third point follows along similar lines. The very fact that
Twining conceives of his general jurisprudence in a way that involves
"multiple perspectives and conceptions of the subject matters" 5
reduces the likelihood that it can be achieved. The problem is not
with having multiple perspectives, which is commonplace today and
can be a healthy factor in the production of knowledge. It is just hard
to imagine, however, that a collective discipline can develop if there
is no overlapping consensus on the subject matter because a collective
discussion must revolve around basic shared themes.
Twining suggests that the subject matter of a general
jurisprudence is a theoretically, normatively, and empirically
sophisticated understanding of law and society from multiple
perspectives at every level from the micro to the universal.26 That is
too broad a charge. Will there be a shared community of discourse?
Will there be progress or an accumulation of knowledge? Can a
"discipline" develop around a field that claims to focus on just about
everything about law and society beyond a single legal system?
I do not intend to place unfair emphasis on particular words in
the above passage. Twining probably did not invoke the term
"discipline" in the strong sense to which I am holding him; but the
thrust of my observations would remain even if he had not used the
word. The crucial points, to repeat, are that it cannot be said that the
general jurisprudence he promotes is being pursued by any single
group of scholars; and, as a separate point, that the extraordinarily
expansive, open-minded, ecumenical, and unspecified terms in which
he characterizes the project renders it unlikely to be embraced.
25 Twining, supra note 2, at 52.
26 See id. at 19.
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The problem lies in the factors that enable and limit the
production of knowledge about law. Twining's vision of a general
jurisprudence is not supported by any current discipline that produces
knowledge about law. To be successful, Twining must persuade a
significant subset of individuals working within these separate
disciplines to embrace the general jurisprudence project as their own.
They must then be willing and able to surmount the barriers (e.g.
conceptual, knowledge, terminology, and institutional barriers) that
distinguish these disciplines and keep them separated. Knowledge-
producing traditions are self-perpetuating, and they enforce
conformity in various ways. This includes, for example, professors
grooming graduate students, judgments about what projects merit
funding, acceptances for publication, and hiring decisions. Under
these circumstances, it is difficult to recruit others to join a homeless
project, however attractive, that exists mostly in the works of a
visionary thinker.
III. A Viable General Jurisprudence
My position should not be read as defeatist. To the contrary, I
believe a general jurisprudence is a viable project, though I am far
less confident than Twining that it is already being built. My
argument has several implications and recommendations for the
success of such a project.
One strategic point is that the prospects for a general
jurisprudence are enhanced if it is situated within an existing
intellectual and institutional framework. As I indicated earlier, legal
professionals can function adequately without a sophisticated legal
theory, without empirical knowledge of law, and certainly without a
general jurisprudence. No friendly reception can be found in that
direction. Instead, general jurisprudence must be housed in an
academic framework, because that is the nature of the project.
The obvious place for a general jurisprudence of the type
Twining envisions is in sociological - not analytical -jurisprudence.
This field is avowedly committed to the production of theoretically
and empirically sophisticated accounts of the relationship between
law and society. This is the core of the project that Twining
promotes.2 7 Although much of the current focus within the discipline
27 See id. at 34.
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remains on particular legal systems, there is no impediment to
encouraging greater interest in more general studies of law -
something already taking place within sociological jurisprudence.
When building a general jurisprudence, practitioners of
sociological jurisprudence can, and should, draw upon all of the
various bodies of literature and subjects identified and discussed by
Twining.2 8 They should build in a manner that, over time, creates
shared terminology, concepts, and knowledge. Glenn's theoretical
work29 on comparative legal traditions and Roberts's work30 on
disputing systems can be easily incorporated into sociological
jurisprudence, creating a foundation for Twining's general
jurisprudence.
Twining will likely agree that sociological jurisprudence has
an affinity with his general jurisprudence, but his assertion that a
general jurisprudence must also include a strong normative
dimension 31 raises a problem. Sociological jurisprudence, at least
traditionally, has tended to abstain from engaging in normative
debates, though there are exceptions. This reflects the broader
tendency of social scientists to refrain from normative engagements in
their empirical work. Twining's desire to include normative and
participatory components in his general jurisprudence 32 conflicts with
these aspects of sociological jurisprudence.
Although the aforementioned tension can likely be managed
in a way that conforms to Twining's vision, the following comments
raise a more direct challenge. In my view, the concept of law is
central to virtually every attempt at a general jurisprudence. Twining
has indicated that he believes it is not fruitful - and perhaps
impossible - to expound a single concept or definition of law other
28 See id. at 28-32.
29 See id. at 36 nn.99-100. See also H. Patrick Glenn, A Transnational Concept
of Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LEGAL STUDIES 893 (Peter Cane &
Mark Tushnet eds., 2003); H. Patrick Glenn, Persuasive Authority, 32 MCGILL
L.J. 261 (1987).
30 Twining, supra note 2, at 51. See also Simon Roberts, After Government? On
Representing Law Without the State, 68 MOD. L. REV. 1 (2005); SIMON
ROBERTS & MICHAEL PALMER, DISPUTE PROCESSES: ADR AND THE PRIMARY
FORMS OF DECISION-MAKING (2d ed. 2005).
" See Twining, supra note 2, at 56-57.
32 id.
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than in a provisional and context-specific sense. 33 The problems
associated with working out the concept of law are formidable and
have stumped many generations of thinkers. 34 Learning from these
failures, Twining takes the following approach:
In the specific context of mapping law from a global
perspective, I have been willing to indicate some
broad criteria of identification not very different from
Llewellyn's, but subject to three caveats: first, that
this is intended for no more than clarification in a
quite specific context; second, it is not intended that
this characterization should carry much theoretical
weight; and, third, that this conception represents only
one way among several others for categorizing the
phenomena for this particular purpose.
35
If the goal at hand is to map law from a global perspective, then it is
essential that Twining produce criteria for the identification of law.
There can be no map otherwise. The first and second caveats follow
from his analysis, but the third is puzzling. It makes sense to assert
that law can be conceptualized differently between projects -
Twining's first caveat. However, if his third caveat implies that even
within a particular map there can be different conceptualizations of
law, this is worrisome. For the sake of consistency and coherence,
one must identify and utilize a single and consistent conceptualization
of law for any particular map.
No doubt Twining can clear this up, but I intend my questions
to draw out a larger point about what it means to construct a general
jurisprudence. Running through this paper is an ambiguity about the
nature of the project; an ambiguity hinted at by the presence of two
formulations of its label-"general jurisprudence," as Twining tends
to call it, versus "a general jurisprudence," as I tend to call it.
"General jurisprudence" sounds like a field of thought or a discipline
- one equally capable of standing alongside, falling within, or even
3 Id. at 35.
34 See Brian Z. Tamanaha, An Analytical Map of Social Scientific Approaches to
the Concept of Law, 15 OXFORD J. OF LEGAL STUDIEs 501 (1995).
35 Twining, supra note 2, at 45.
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encompassing the established disciplines of analytical, sociological,
normative, and critical jurisprudence - and that is how Twining tends
to refer to it.36 "A general jurisprudence," the phrasing I use, is not a
field of thought, but refers to a specific theoretical framework for
understanding and studying law at a general level. Twining's "map of
law from a global perspective," alluded to in the above quotation,
would constitute a framework of this kind.37 My book, A General
Jurisprudence of Law and Society, laid out a different framework.38
The number of similar frameworks is potentially limitless, each of
which would constitute a general jurisprudence in the sense that I
intend.
A sensible way to reconcile these differences is to
characterize each given framework as a general jurisprudence, while
labeling all such frameworks as examples of or exercises in general
jurisprudence. This does not, however, necessitate a field or
discipline called general jurisprudence. There is currently no general
jurisprudence discipline or field, as I indicated, and there are
formidable knowledge and institutional barriers to its emergence.
39
The present argument is stronger: that there is no need for such a
discipline beyond that of a label applied collectively to individual
attempts at constructing a general jurisprudence.
A related and final matter of dispute revolves around what
constitutes or qualifies as "a general jurisprudence." As I argued
earlier, Twining's approach is so expansive that it brings in almost
everything about law that goes beyond a particular state legal
system. 40  This expansiveness discards the quality that makes a
general jurisprudence distinctively "general." Twining's notion of
"mapping law from a global perspective" is "general" in the sense
that it is broad in scope and application. 41 However, Twining's
approach includes any "theoretical study of two or more legal
traditions, cultures, or orders ... from the microcomparative to the
36 See Twining, supra note 2, at 2-3.
37 Id. at 45.
38 See BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, A GENERAL JURISPRUDENCE OF LAW AND SOCIETY
(2001).
'9 See infra p. 76.
40 See infra pp. 76-77.
41 Twining, supra note 2, at 45.
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universal. 42  There is nothing general about a microcomparative
study of two legal traditions. If it is to have a distinctive meaning and
identity, "general" must mean more than "anything not particular."
These are not merely terminological disputes. They have
implications that go to the heart of what general jurisprudence means,
which will determine the shape it will take, whether it will be a viable
project, and what its fruits will be. At this juncture, the meaning of
this label is contested, and no single individual or group has final say
over how it is defined. It is an old label, initially used by analytical
jurists, which Twining and I are attempting to wrest from their grip
and reconstruct in the hope that it will help support the production of
the kind of knowledge about law that we both deem essential and find
lacking. For the reasons indicated in this response, I believe my
construction of the term, and suggested placement of the project, is
more likely to achieve the objectives that Twining and I largely share.
However it may turn out, there is no doubt that Twining's
work on general jurisprudence stands on its own as a major
contribution to the development of a theoretically and empirically
sophisticated understanding of law.
4 21Id. at 19.
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